Second Court of Appeals

Week of February 25, 2019 

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of Week of February 25, 2019.

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

 

L Series, L.L.C. v. Holt, No. 02-17-00415-CV (Feb. 28, 2019) (Birdwell, J., joined by Kerr, J.).

Held: The interlocutory order in this case––which granted partial summary judgment as a matter of law on Holt’s counterclaim for advancement of his fees and expenses pursuant to a contractual right in corporate documents––was not appealable as a temporary injunction ruling under section 51.014(a)(4) of the civil practice and remedies code. Additionally, Appellants were not entitled to alternative mandamus relief because Holt proved his entitlement to advancement––as distinguished from indemnity––under the plain language of the documents, and even though the trial court’s order circumvented Appellants’ traditional right to supersedeas, that is a consequence for which Appellants contracted in advance.

 

In re Commitment of Jones, No. 02-18-00019-CV (Feb. 28, 2019) (Sudderth, C.J., joined by Kerr and Pittman, JJ.).

Held: In this sexually-violent-predator civil commitment proceeding, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict in favor of commitment, but the trial court reversibly erred by refusing to give the jury a 10-2 verdict instruction.  The plain wording of the health and safety code only requires a unanimous verdict when a jury decides that a person is a sexually violent predator; it does not impose such a requirement for the jury to decide that a person is not a sexually violent predator. Thus, the civil rules of procedure apply and allow for such a determination to be made through the agreement of only 10 jurors.

 

Alvarez v. State, No. 02-18-00193-CR (Feb. 28, 2019) (Birdwell, J., joined by Gabriel and Kerr, JJ.).

Held: Article 102.004(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which imposes a fee on a defendant convicted by a jury, does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Texas constitution and is, therefore, not facially unconstitutional. An interconnected statute, Government Code section 113.004(b), provides for the collected fee to be spent only on a certain class of expenses, which includes juries, which in turn can include criminal juries; thus, Alvarez did not show that the fees collected under article 102.004(a) cannot be used for a legitimate criminal justice purpose in all circumstances.