Second Court of Appeals

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of January 22, 2018.

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist., No. 02-17-00042-CV (January 25, 2018) (Meier, J., joined by Walker and Gabriel, JJ.).

Held:  TRWD’s property is not tax exempt under article XI, section 9 of the Texas constitution or pursuant to the Organic Statute’s section 11, but it is tax exempt under tax code section 11.11(a).

Jimenez v. McGeary, No. 02-17-00085-CV (Jan. 25, 2018) (Kerr, J., joined by Sudderth, C.J., and Gabriel, J.).

Held: This court’s conclusion in Norvelle v. PNC Mortgage, 472 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.)—that rule 510.3(a)’s requirement that a petition in an eviction case “must be sworn to by the plaintiff” did not defeat the trial court’s jurisdiction when a corporate plaintiff’s forcible-detainer petition was sworn to and signed by its attorney—extends to eviction cases in which the plaintiff is a natural person. In such a case, a plaintiff’s attorney may verify and sign a forcible-detainer petition as the plaintiff’s agent. But even if such a verification were defective, it would not defeat the trial court’s jurisdiction over the action.

In re G.V., No. 02-17-00220-CV (Jan. 25, 2018) (Walker, J., dissents with opinion to order denying motion for rehearing en banc).

Dissent:  The dissent would hold (1) that family code section 153.0071’s mediated settlement agreement (MSA) provisions cannot be enforced as binding in a termination suit brought by the Department of Family and Protective Services under chapter 161 of the family code when a party revokes consent prior to judgment on the MSA; (2) that Mother and Father revoked their consent to the MSA in this termination suit before judgment was entered on the MSA; and (3) that Mother and Father’s remaining issues—attacking the MSA’s provisions imposing a 48-month limitation on the filing of any motions to modify absent some undefined “emergency”—are ripe.