Second Court of Appeals

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of April 24, 2017.

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

In re A.H., No. 02-16-00320-CV (Apr. 27, 2017) (Livingston, C.J., joined by Meier and Gabriel, JJ.).

Held:  The judgment was affirmed in this Anders appeal from an adjudication of a juvenile.  However, rather than granting counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court denied the motion, applying the reasoning of In re P.M. to hold that under Texas Family Code section 51.101, appointed counsel continues to serve until all appeals have been exhausted.   No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (order).

Legoland Discovery Ctr. (Dallas), LLC v. Superior Builders, LLC, No. 02-16-00425-CV (Apr. 27, 2017) (Gabriel, J., joined by Livingston, C.J., and Pittman, J.).

Held:  Superior Builders entered into a construction contract with Legoland that included a broad arbitration clause.  In Superior Builders’ subsequent suit against Legoland and several of Superior Builders’ subcontractors, Legoland’s compulsory counterclaims, agreement to a scheduling order, settlement efforts regarding the subcontractors, and “basic” discovery did not substantially invoke the judicial process such that Legoland impliedly waived its contractual right to compel arbitration even though Superior Builders’ suit was filed twenty-two months before Legoland filed its motion to compel arbitration.

Banister v. State, No. 02-16-00320-CR (Apr. 27, 2017) (Walker, J., joined by Livingston, C.J., and Pittman, J.).

Held:  Although Appellant did not object in the trial court on the grounds that his punishment was disproportionate and that the trial court failed to consider the entire range of punishment, Appellant was entitled to raise the latter due-process complaint for the first time on appeal.  Appellant however could not prevail on his due-process complaint because the record established that the trial court did consider the full range of punishment when it imposed a five-year sentence, which is less than the ten-year maximum punishment allowed for a DWI conviction with two prior DWI convictions; did not willfully impose a predetermined sentence; and did not demonstrate bias; thus, the record did not clearly indicate a denial of Appellant’s due-process rights.