Second Court of Appeals
Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of January 11, 2016.
NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.
Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.
Jack Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Jack Cty. Hosp. Dist., No. 02-14-00188-CV (Jan. 14, 2016) (Gardner, J., joined by Walker, J.; Gabriel, J., dissents with opinion).
Held: The Hospital District—a political subdivision of Texas—established as a matter of law that it was the owner of a leased CT scanner within the meaning of tax code section 11.11(h) because the lease agreement gave the Hospital District the right to purchase the CT scanner at the end of the lease term, thereby giving the Hospital District the right to compel delivery of legal title to the CT scanner at the end of the lease term. Thus, the CT scanner, which was used for public purposes, was tax exempt under tax code section 11.11(a), and the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the Hospital District.
Dissent: The lease between the Hospital District and Provident Leasing expressly provided that it was a finance lease and, by its terms, was not a lease-purchase agreement. The finance lease did not give the Hospital District the right to compel delivery of legal title at the end of the lease term; thus, the Hospital District did not carry its burden to show it was entitled to the tax exemption.
Hopper v. State, No. 02-14-00467-CR (Jan. 14, 2016) (Gabriel, J., joined by Sudderth, J.; Dauphinot, J., dissents with opinion).
Held: In conviction for continuous family violence with a deadly weapon, evidence was sufficient to support jury's finding that Appellant used his hands as a deadly weapon because both complainants testified they believed they would die while Appellant impeded their breathing, both were physically injured, and an expert testified that Appellant used his hands during the attacks in a manner that was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.
Dissent: The evidence was not sufficient to support the deadly weapon finding because there was no evidence that when Appellant committed family violence assault under the statute by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing of the complainants, who did not lose consciousness, he also intentionally or knowingly used his hands as deadly weapons.