Second Court of Appeals

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of February 8, 2016.

NOTE:  Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Tri-County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. GTE Sw. Inc. d/b/a Verizon Sw., No. 02-14-00199-CV (Feb. 11, 2016) (Livingston, C.J., joined by Gardner and Meier, JJ.).

Held:  The visiting trial judge erred by granting summary judgment for Verizon on Tri-County's claims for breach of contract and, alternatively, trespass because the contract between them for the joint use of each's utility poles required removal of attachments upon termination of the contract.  A fact issue exists as to which of Tri-County's claims is viable because there is a fact issue as to whether Tri-County treated Verizon as a tenant at sufferance or a tenant at will.  The trial judge did not err, however, by granting Verizon a no-evidence summary judgment on Tri-County's claim for exemplary damages because Tri-County did not present evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue as to malice.

Bedford v. Spassoff, No. 02-15-00045-CV (Feb. 11, 2016) (Meier, J.; Dauphinot, J., concurs without opinion; Walker, J., dissents with opinion).

Held:  The trial court erred by denying the Bedfords' motion to dismiss Appellees' business disparagement, IIED, tortious interference, and breach of contract claims, but Appellees met their burden to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of their libel claim.

Dissent:  Appellees failed to meet their burden under the TCPA by presenting clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for the elements of libel concerning either of Mr. Bedford's written statements.  Mr. Bedford's email could not form the basis of a libel claim because it was not published to a third party.  Mr. Bedford's Facebook post was not defamatory because a person of ordinary intelligence would view the entire post as well as each statement contained in that post as an expression of Mr. Bedford's own opinion.  Even if the post was defamatory, it was not defamatory per se, and Appellees presented no evidence on the elements of damages.

In re R.D., No. 02-15-00115-CV (Feb. 11, 2016) (Meier, J., joined by Gardner and Walker, JJ.).

Held:  This is a case of first impression regarding the Texas Education Code's "Exhibition of Firearms" statute.  Here, the law authorized by the State's charging instrument, as modified by the factual details pleaded by the State, required the State to prove that R.D. intended to cause alarm to the school's on-campus police officer when R.D. repeatedly stated that he was going to "kill" the officer by bringing a gun to school grounds and "shoot" him.  Even though the threats were not made in the presence of the officer, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, a reasonable inference from the cumulative force of the evidence supports that R.D. intended that his threats would be conveyed to the officer and that they were intended to cause alarm to the officer.