Second Court of Appeals

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of October 26, 2015.

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Lake v. Cravens, No. 02-11-00464-CV (Oct. 29, 2015) (Meier, J., joined by Dauphinot and Gabriel, JJ.).

Held:  Cravens lacked standing to recover individually for lost profits that allegedly derived from his interest in the Partnership, and he lacked standing to recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages because he presented no evidence that he was personally aggrieved by the alleged fraud. Further, legally insufficient evidence supports the jury's award of reliance damages to Cravens, the Partnership cannot recover against RCC or Lake for unjust enrichment because an express contract covers the subject matter of the dispute, and Maguire was entitled to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to his claim for contractual indemnity.

In re Hayward, No. 02-15-00299-CV (Oct. 26, 2015) (orig. proceeding) (Walker, J., joined by Dauphinot and Gabriel, JJ).

Held:  Relators' petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted because Real Party in Interest failed to prove the third element necessary to entitle her to the establishment of a constructive trust—a res of $10 million cash that was wrongfully taken from her. As Real Party in Interest did not establish an identifiable res constituting the same property—or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or revenues therefrom—that was wrongfully taken from her, Respondent abused her discretion in ordering the constructive trust.

Bledsoe v. State, No. 02-14-00450-CR (Oct. 29, 2015) (Gabriel, J., joined by Walker, J.; Dauphinot, J., dissents with opinion).

Held:  Although convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six and indecency with a child under the age of 17 are affirmed, the judgment for aggravated sexual assault of a child is modified to clarify that the age of the child was younger than six and to add penal code section 22.021(f)(1) to the judgment's reference to section 22.021(a)(2)(B). The age of the child was an element of the offense as charged that the State was required to prove and ensures the proper calculation of Bledsoe's sentence by prison officials.

Dissent:  Subsection (f) of section 22.021 is a punishment provision, not an element of the offense. The trial court's judgment was correct; it already provided that the child was younger than six. The trial court's judgment also provided the correct statute under which Appellant was convicted, the name of the offense in the space for the name of the offense, and the punishment information in the space for the punishment information.