# Report on Judicial Salaries and Turnover

# For Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009



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## **Executive Summary**

The 79<sup>th</sup> Texas Legislature charged the Office of Court Administration (OCA) with collecting information relating to state judicial turnover and salaries to provide the Legislature with information to facilitate legislation that ensures that the compensation of state judges is adequate and appropriate.

#### **Extent of and Reasons for Judicial Turnover**

From September 1, 2007 through August 31, 2009, 14.1 percent of the 547 judges that served in the state's appellate and district courts left the state judiciary. Of the 77 judges that left the state judiciary, 41 (53.2 percent) left involuntarily, primarily due to defeat in a primary or general election. Other reasons for involuntary separation included death, mandatory retirement, and removal from office.

Thirty-one of the 36 judges (86.1 percent) who voluntarily left the state judiciary during this time period responded to OCA's judicial turnover survey. Respondents were asked to indicate which factor(s) influenced their decision to leave the state judiciary. The most common factor that strongly influenced respondents' decision to leave was *retirement* (48.4 percent). In addition, 32.3 percent named *salary* and 25.8 percent named *personal reasons* as significant contributors to their departures.

#### **Judicial Salaries**

In 2010, the State Bar of Texas conducted a survey of salaries received by full-time attorneys in the state during the previous year. Results of the survey showed the average salary of private practitioners to be \$166,381. The average salary of a private practitioner was 10.9 percent higher than the salary of a justice or judge on the state's two courts of last resort, 15.0 percent higher than the *average* state salary of a justice of intermediate court of appeals, and 20.3 percent higher than the *average* state salary of a district judge.

The *average* salary for a district judge in Texas was 1.2 percent higher than the salary of a general jurisdiction trial court judge in New York (the state with the next lowest salary) and was 29.3 percent lower than the salary of a similar judge in California (the state with the highest level of compensation).

*Average* salaries for justices of the Texas courts of appeals ranged from 0.5 percent higher to 0.6 percent lower than salaries for similar judges in New York, which had the lowest salaries among the five other states closest in population to Texas. Texas salaries were approximately 40 percent lower than salaries for similar judges in California, the state with the highest levels of compensation for appellate court judges.

Salaries for justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals were about one percent lower than salaries of justices of similar courts in New York, which had the lowest salaries among the five other states closest in population to Texas. Compared to California, where the highest salaries were, the salary of Texas judges was 45 to 50 percent lower.

## Introduction

## Purpose

To provide the Legislature with information to facilitate legislation that ensures that the compensation of state judges is adequate and appropriate, the 79<sup>th</sup> Texas Legislature charged the Office of Court Administration (OCA) with collecting information relating to state judicial turnover. Section 72.030 of the Texas Government Code<sup>1</sup> requires OCA to: 1) obtain data on the rate at which state judges resign from office or do not seek re-election, as well as the reason for these actions; and 2) file a report containing this data for the preceding state fiscal biennium with the governor, lieutenant governor, speaker of the house of representatives, and presiding officers of the standing committees of each house of the Legislature with jurisdiction over the judiciary or appropriations. The report must also include the following findings: 1) whether the compensation of state judges exceeds, is equal to, or is less than the compensation of judges at corresponding levels in the five states closest in population to Texas; and 2) whether the compensation of state judges exceeds, is equal to, or is less than the average salary of lawyers engaged in the private practice of law.

## Methodology

OCA does not receive formal notification when a judge leaves office. As a result, data for general turnover in the state judiciary from September 1, 2007 through August 31, 2009 were compiled from notices of appointment from the Governor's Office, election results from the Secretary of State's website, and news articles concerning the departure of judges.

The findings on reasons for voluntary turnover presented in this report are based on the survey responses of state appellate and district judges who left the state judiciary voluntarily during the period. Designed by OCA staff and reviewed and approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the survey instrument asked respondents to indicate: 1) to what extent certain factors influenced their decision to leave their current positions; and 2) what they did immediately after leaving office.

Surveys were sent to each of the 36 appellate and district judges that left the state judiciary voluntarily during the biennium. Surveys were sent the same day that OCA received notification about a resignation. Follow-up letters, along with another copy of the questionnaire, were sent to judges who had not responded within a month. Thirty-one responses were received, for a response rate of 86.1 percent.

Data on the average salaries of Texas appellate and district judges as of October 1, 2010, including supplements paid by counties, were obtained from the State Comptroller of Public Accounts. Data on salaries of private practitioners in Texas were obtained from income data collected by the State Bar of Texas for its *Private Practitioner 2009 Income Report*. Data on salaries of state judges in other states were obtained from the July 2010 survey of state judicial salaries conducted by the National Center for State Courts.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Added by H.B. 11, 79<sup>th</sup> Legislature, 2<sup>nd</sup> Called Session (2005).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> National Center for State Courts. Judicial Salary Resource Center. National Center for State Courts. <u>http://www.ncsconline.org/D\_KIS/salary\_survey/query.asp</u> (accessed November 18, 2009).

## Judicial Turnover

### Extent of Turnover in the Judiciary

In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, 547 judges served in the state's appellate and district courts.<sup>3</sup> During this period, 79 judges left their current positions, representing a turnover rate of 14.4 percent. However, two of these judges were appointed to a higher-level state court position, making the turnover rate for judges leaving the state judiciary 14.1 percent. When taking into account whether judges left the state judiciary voluntarily, the turnover rate fell to 6.6 percent—4.0 percent did not seek re-election, and 2.6 percent resigned. (See **Tables 1 and 2**.)

Table 1: Turnover of State Appellate and District JudgesSeptember 1, 2007 through August 31, 2009						
Number of Percentage of Judges All Judges						
Total Number of Appellate and District Judge Positions	547	100.0 %				
Judges Leaving Current Office	79	14.4 %				
Judges Leaving State Judiciary	77	14.1 %				
Judges Leaving State Judiciary Voluntarily 36 6.6 °						

Of the 77 judges leaving the state judiciary during the biennium, more than half (53.2 percent) left involuntarily, primarily due to defeat in a primary or general election. Other reasons for involuntary separation were death, mandatory retirement, and removal from office.


Table 2: Manner in Which State Appellate and District Judges Left Office September 1, 2007 through August 31, 2009						
	Number	Percentage of All Judges Leaving Office	Percentage of All Judges			
Defeated in election	36	45.6 %	6.6 %			
Did not seek re-election	22	27.8 %	4.0 %			
Resigned	14	17.7 %	2.6 %			
Reached mandatory retirement age	3	3.8 %	0.5 %			
Appointed/elected to higher state court	2	2.5 %	0.4 %			
Removed from office	1	1.3 %	0.2 %			
Deceased	1	1.3 %	0.2 %			
Total	79	100.0 %	14.4 % *			

\* Does not total to 14.4 percent due to rounding.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> One judge served on each of the state's 449 district courts, and 98 judges served on the state's 16 appellate courts.

#### **Reasons for Voluntary Turnover**

Thirty-one of the 36 judges who voluntarily left the state judiciary in FYs 2008 and 2009 responded to OCA's survey. Respondents were asked to indicate which factor(s) influenced their decision to leave the state judiciary. Approximately 48 percent of the respondents indicated that **retirement** played a large role in their decision to leave. In addition, approximately 32 percent named **salary**, and approximately a quarter of respondents named **personal reasons**, as large contributors to their departures. (See **Figure 1**.)



In FYs 2008 and 2009, judges most frequently indicated that **retirement** was a factor "to some extent" in their decisions, with approximately 23 percent of judges selecting this factor. **Salary**, **self-employment**, **and personal reasons** ranked second, with nearly 13 percent of judges selecting each of these factors. (See Figure 2.)




The survey also allowed respondents to note other factors that contributed to their decision. In FYs 2008 and 2009, respondents identified the following additional factors that influenced their decision "to a very great extent":

- Health (3.2 percent of all respondents);
- Age (3.2 percent);
- Did not wish to run again (3.2 percent);
- Return to practice law with sons (3.2 percent);
- Partisan politics (3.2 percent);
- Work closer to home (3.2 percent);
- Desire to serve my country in lifetime appointed position (3.2 percent); and
- Want to be closer to grandchildren (3.2 percent).

### Next Steps for Judges after Resigning or Completing Their Terms

After resigning or completing their terms, of the 31 judges responding who voluntarily left office in FYs 2008 and 2009, nine judges (29.0 percent) retired from the judiciary but continued to work in the private sector and eight judges (25.8 percent) took another position with higher salary and/or better benefits. Four judges (12.9 percent) retired but continued to work as a visiting judge, four (12.9 percent) became self-employed, two (6.5 percent) retired and did not continue to work, two (6.5 percent) ran for another office, and two (6.5 percent) retired but continued to work in state or local government. (See **Figure 3**.)



## **Judicial Salaries**

## Salaries of Elected State Judges as of September 1, 2010

In August 2005, the 79<sup>th</sup> Legislature amended statutes relating to the compensation of state judges (H.B. 11, 79<sup>th</sup> Legislature, Second Called Session (2005)).

Effective December 1, 2005, the annual state salary of a district judge increased to \$125,000. While Chapter 32 of the Government Code authorizes the state salaries of district court judges to be supplemented from county funds, amendments made to Section 659.012 of the Government Code limited the total annual salary for a district judge to a combined sum from state and county sources of \$5,000 less than the state salary provided for a justice of a court of appeals. In addition, the enactment eliminated special provisions created in Chapter 32 during the 78<sup>th</sup> Legislature allowing unrestricted payment by certain counties of an annual supplemental salary to district judges.

The annual state salary of a justice of a court of appeals increased to 110 percent of the annual state salary of a district judge. In addition, the chief justice of an appellate court receives \$2,500 more than the other justices of the court. While Chapter 31 of the Government Code authorizes the counties in each court of appeals district to pay each justice of the court of appeals for that district for judicial and administrative services rendered, amendments made to Section 659.012 of the Government Code limit the total salary for a justice of a court of appeals to a combined sum from state and county sources of \$5,000 less than the state salary paid to a justice of the Supreme Court. This same provision limits the chief justices of the Supreme Court. Finally, the annual state salary of a justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals increased to 120 percent of the annual state salary of a district judge. Moreover, the chief justice or presiding judge of these courts receives \$2,500 more than the other justices or judges on the courts. **Table 3** provides the salary summary for elected state judges as of September 1, 2010.

Beginning September 1, 2007, judges became entitled to monthly longevity pay of \$20 for each year of service credited in the retirement system (maximum of \$320 per month) after completing 16 years of service. In addition, district judges presiding over silica or asbestos multi-district litigation became entitled to receive, in addition to their regular district judge salary and supplement, the maximum amount of compensation set by the Texas Judicial Council for a presiding judge of an administrative judicial region under Section 74.051(b) of the Government Code.

In June 2009, the 81<sup>st</sup> Legislature amended the statutes relating to longevity pay (S.B. 497, 81<sup>st</sup> Legislature, Regular Session). Effective September 1, 2009, judges became entitled to monthly longevity pay equal to 3.1 percent of their current monthly state salary, rather than \$20 a month, for each year of service credited in the retirement system after completing 16 years of service. In addition, the counties' commissioners courts were authorized to provide longevity pay calculated in accordance with these criteria to any active state judge who had previously served as a statutory county court judge in the county and would be entitled to longevity pay if the service credit the judge or justice earned as a statutory court judge was established in the applicable retirement system. Furthermore, this legislation clarified that longevity pay is not included as part of the judge's or justice's combined salary from state and county sources for purposes of the salary limitations provided by Section 659.012.

Table 3: Salary Summary for Elected State Judges as of September 1, 2010						
Judge <sup>1</sup>	State Salary	Additional Compensation <sup>2</sup>	Other	Total		
Chief Justice – Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals	\$152,500	N/A		\$152,500		
Justice – Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals	\$150,000	N/A		\$150,000		
Chief – Court of Appeals	\$140,000	up to \$7,500 <sup>3</sup>		up to \$147,500		
Justice – Court of Appeals	\$137,500	up to \$7,500 <sup>3</sup>		up to \$145,000		
Presiding Judge of Administrative Judicial Region (active district judge)	\$125,000	up to \$15,000 <sup>3</sup>	not to exceed \$33,000 <sup>4</sup>	up to \$173,000		
Presiding Judge of Administrative Judicial Region (retired or former judge)	N/A	N/A	\$35,000 - 50,000 <sup>5</sup>	up to \$50,000		
District Judge – Local administrative judge who serves in county with more than 5 district courts	\$125,000	up to \$15,000 <sup>3</sup>	\$5,000 <sup>6</sup>	up to \$145,000		
District Judge	\$125,000	up to \$15,000 <sup>3</sup>		up to \$140,000		
District Judge – Presiding judge of silica or asbestos multi-district litigation	\$125,000	up to \$15,000 <sup>3</sup>	not to exceed $$33,000^{7}$	up to \$173,000		

Notes:

1. Entitled to monthly longevity pay of 3.1 percent of current monthly state salary for each year of service credited in the retirement system after completing 16 years of service.

2. Additional compensation provided by counties in judicial and appellate districts for extra judicial service performed by judges and justices. Government Code Secs. 31.001 and 32.001.

3. The state salary of a district judge whose county supplement exceeds \$15,000, or appellate justice whose county supplement exceeds \$7,500, will be reduced by the amount of the excess so that the maximum salary the judge or justice receives from state and county sources is \$140,000 (district judge), \$145,000 (appellate justice), or \$147,500 (appellate chief justice). Government Code Secs. 659.012, 31.001 and 32.001.

4. Presiding judges' salary set by Texas Judicial Council. Government Code Sec. 74.051(b). Paid by counties in administrative judicial region on a pro rata basis based on population.

5. Presiding judges' salary based on number of courts and judges in region. Government Code Sec. 74.051(c). Paid by counties in administrative judicial region on a pro rata basis based on population.

6. Government Code Sec. 659.012(d).

7. Government Code Sec. 659.0125.

#### Judicial Salaries Compared with Salaries of Private Practitioners

In 2010, the State Bar of Texas collected income data for its *Private Practitioner 2009 Income Report*. For that report, a questionnaire was sent electronically on April 7, 2010 to all active State Bar of Texas attorneys who had not opted out of taking surveys (73,140 attorneys). The survey's response rate was 12 percent, with a total of 8,467 attorneys responding.

A total of 2,264 full-time, private practitioner attorneys responded to the survey. Results of the survey showed that the salaries of lawyers vary widely. Overall, full-time private practitioners had a median salary of \$120,324 and an average salary of \$166,381. Nearly 23 percent of the attorneys had salaries of \$187,500 or more.

Lawyers with 11 to 15 years of experience had a median salary of \$122,884 and an average salary of \$158,001. Twenty-four percent of attorneys in this group had salaries of \$187,500 or more. Lawyers with 16 to 20 years of experience had a median salary of \$141,176 and an average salary of \$156,929. Thirty percent of lawyers in this group had salaries of \$187,500 or more. (See **Table 4**.)

Table 4: Comparison of Salaries of Elected State Judgesto Salaries of Private Practitioners in Texas					
Differen   Avera   Elect   Judges a   Average Salary					
Private Practitioner	\$166,381 <sup>1,2</sup>				
Chief Justice/Presiding Judge of Highest Court of Appeals	\$152,500	-9.1 %			
Justice/Judge of Highest Court of Appeals	\$150,000	-10.9 %			
Chief Justice of Intermediate Court of Appeals	\$140,000 <sup>3</sup> \$147,174 <sup>4</sup>	-18.8 % -13.1 %			
Justice of Intermediate Court of Appeals	\$137,500 <sup>3</sup> \$144,674 <sup>4</sup>	-21.0 % -15.0 %			
District Court Judge	\$125,000 <sup>3</sup> \$138,302 <sup>4</sup>	-33.1 % -20.3 %			

Notes:

1. State Bar of Texas, *Private Practitioner 2009 Income Report* (Austin: Department of Research and Analysis, State Bar of Texas, 2010).

2. The median salary for private practitioners was \$120,324.

3. Basic state salary. Does not include supplements paid by counties.

4. Includes supplements paid by counties as of October 1, 2010. Data on supplemental compensation are from affidavits filed with the State Comptroller of Public Accounts.

#### Salaries of State Judges in the Six Most Populous States

According to data obtained from the National Center for State Courts, the state salaries of state judges in Texas lagged behind the salaries of judges at corresponding levels in the five states closest to Texas in population. (See **Table 5**.)

Table 5: Salaries of State Judges in the Six Most Populous States as of July 1, 20101Listed in Population Order						
Judge	California	Texas	New York	Florida	Illinois	Pennsylvania
Chief Justice – Court of Last Resort	\$228,856	\$152,500	\$156,000	\$157,976	\$207,066	\$191,876
Associate Justice – Court of Last Resort	\$218,237	\$150,000	\$151,200	\$157,976	\$207,066	\$186,450
Chief – Intermediate Court of Appeals	\$204,599	\$140,000 <sup>2</sup> \$147,180 <sup>3</sup>	\$148,000	\$150,077	\$194,888	\$181,349
Justice – Intermediate Court of Appeals	\$204,599	\$137,500 <sup>2</sup> \$144,810 <sup>3</sup>	\$144,000	\$150,077	\$194,888	\$175,923
Judge – General Jurisdiction Trial Courts	\$178,789	\$125,000 <sup>2</sup> \$138,200 <sup>3</sup>	\$136,700	\$142,178	\$178,835	\$161,850
Reported Date of Last Salary Change and Type of Change	November 2007 (Increase)	September 2005 (Increase)	January 1999 (Increase)	July 2009 (Decrease)	July 2010 (Increase)	January 2009 (Increase)

Notes:

1. Source: Knowledge and Information Services Division, National Center for State Courts, Survey of Judicial Salaries as of July 1, 2010. The National Center for State Courts attempts to use actual salaries whenever possible. Thus, the data for each state will include local supplements whenever relevant and feasible.

2. Basic state salary. Does not include supplements paid by counties.

3. Average salary statewide, including supplements paid by counties as of October 1, 2010.

The *average* salary for a district judge in Texas was 1.2 percent higher than the salary of a general jurisdiction trial court judge in New York (the state with the next lowest salary) and was 29.3 percent lower than the salary of a similar judge in California (the state with the highest level of compensation). (See Table 6).

Table 6: Percentage Difference Between the Salary of Texas Judges and the Salaries of State Judges in the Five States Closest to Texas in Population						
Judge	California	New York	Florida	Illinois	Pennsylvania	
Chief Justice – Court of Last Resort	-50.1%	- 2.2%	-3.5%	-26.4%	-20.5%	
Associate Justice – Court of Last Resort	-45.5%	-0.8%	-5.0%	-27.6%	-19.5%	
Chief – Intermediate Court of Appeals	-46.1% <sup>1</sup> - <b>39.0%</b> <sup>2</sup>	-5.4% <sup>1</sup> -0.6% <sup>2</sup>	-6.7% <sup>1</sup> -1.9% <sup>2</sup>	-28.2% <sup>1</sup> -24.5% <sup>2</sup>	-22.8% <sup>1</sup> 18.8-% <sup>2</sup>	
Justice – Intermediate Court of Appeals	-48.8% <sup>1</sup> -41.4% <sup>2</sup>	- 4.5% <sup>1</sup> 0.5% <sup>2</sup>	-8.4% <sup>1</sup> -3.6% <sup>2</sup>	-29.4% <sup>1</sup> -25.8% <sup>2</sup>	-21.8% <sup>1</sup> - <b>17.8%</b> <sup>2</sup>	
Judge – General Jurisdiction Trial Courts Notes:	-43.0% <sup>1</sup> -29.3% <sup>2</sup>	-8.6% <sup>1</sup> 1.2% <sup>2</sup>	-12.1% <sup>1</sup> -2.7% <sup>2</sup>	-30.1% <sup>1</sup> -22.7% <sup>2</sup>	-22.8% <sup>1</sup> -14.5% <sup>2</sup>	

1. Compared to basic state salary in Texas. Does not include supplements paid by counties.

2. Compared to average salary in Texas, including supplements paid by counties as of October 1, 2010.

*Average* salaries for justices of the Texas courts of appeals ranged from 0.5 percent higher to 0.6 percent lower than salaries for similar judges in New York, which had the lowest salaries among the five other states. Texas salaries were approximately 40 percent lower than salaries for similar judges in California, the state with the highest levels of compensation for appellate court judges.

Salaries for justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals were about one percent lower than salaries of justices of similar courts in New York, which had the lowest salaries among the five other states. Compared to California, where the highest salaries were, the salary of Texas judges was 45 to 50 percent lower.

# **APPENDICES**

# **Results of Judicial Turnover Survey** for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009

A. Please indicate to what extent each of the following factors contributed to your decision to leave the Texas state judiciary.		To Very Great Extent	To Some Extent	To a Small Extent	Not At All	No Answer
1	Salary	32.3%	12.9%	12.9%	25.8%	16.1%
2	Benefits	3.2%	6.5%	12.9%	51.6%	25.8%
3	Little or no career advancement opportunities	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	51.6%	29.0%
4	Desire for self-employment	9.7%	12.9%	3.2%	48.4%	25.8%
5	Working conditions/environment (e.g., safety, work-related stress, and/or workload issues)	22.6%	9.7%	3.2%	41.9%	22.6%
6	Retirement	48.4%	22.6%	3.2%	16.1%	9.7%
7	Personal	25.8%	12.9%	9.7%	16.1%	35.5%
8	Other: Health	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
9	Other: Age	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
10	Other: Did not wish to run again	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
11	Other: Return to practice law with sons	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
12	Other: Partisan politics	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
13	Other: Work closer to home	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
14	Other: Desire to serve my country in lifetime appointed position	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%
15	Other: Being closer to grandchildren	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	96.8%

B. A	B. After resigning or finishing out the term, judges plan to:		
1	Obtain another position with higher salary and/or better benefits	25.8%	
2	Obtain another position with comparable salary and/or benefits	0.0%	
3	Become self-employed	12.9%	
4	Run for another office	6.5%	
5	Retire and not continue to work	6.5%	
6	Retire, but continue to work as a visiting judge	12.9%	
7	Retire, but continue to work in the private sector	29.0%	
8	Retire, but continue to work in state or local government	6.5%	
9	Other:	0.0%	

#### **Comments from Respondents**

- 1. Visit grandchildren.
- 2. I plan to work on non-profit boards giving back to the community that has given me so much.
- 3. I served 20 years and now am going to try my hand at semi-retirement with a mediation practice.
- 4. Will also teach government and history for Navarro College.
- 5. Retiring but continuing to work in local government.
- 6. Also work in private sector (mediation).
- 7. It was an honor to serve as a judge, but it was never a goal. I would suggest that all attorneys consider serving, but not as a goal just to get perks and benefits. It should only be for public service, not just for personal glory and power.
- 8. It was a great honor to serve the people of the great State of Texas.
- 9. Retire and become the bond-servant of the Lord (and be a visiting grandparent, but not a visiting judge.) Last year my wife and I were blessed with two more grandchildren, bringing the total to five (the oldest of whom is five). In addition, the combination of my Harris County retirement (I was a prosecutor for 16 years) and my state judicial retirement will give me a raise of \$1,240 a month. Moreover, even before embarking on a 35-year career in the law, I was interested in Christian ministry. In addition, a change in the law postponed an aspiration I had to be appointed to the Court of Criminal Appeals this year, and I am unwilling to postpone retirement to wait for another opportunity.
- 10. Although my salary was significantly higher the last two years on the bench, for the first 12 years my salary was \$96,000 and then \$112,000. This is the primary reason I am leaving the bench—to receive a greater salary. In the next two years, we will have two daughters in private school and, very shortly after that, we'll have one daughter in college.



# **OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION**

CARL REYNOLDS Administrative Director

February 1, 2008

The Honorable Address City, TX ZIP

Dear Judge

:

The Office of Court Administration (OCA) is charged with collecting information relating to state judicial turnover. Section 72.030 of the Texas Government Code requires OCA to obtain data on the rate at which state judges resign from office or do not seek re-election, as well as the reason for these actions.

**Please complete the enclosed survey and return it to our office at your earliest convenience.** We greatly appreciate your assistance. The valuable information you provide will be included in a report to the governor, lieutenant governor, and members of the legislature to provide them better information about judicial compensation and turnover.

If you have any questions about the survey or the report, please contact Angela Garcia, Judicial Information Manager, at (512) 936-1358.

Sincerely,

Carl Reynolds



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# Office of Court Administration Survey on Judicial Turnover

Section 72.030 of the Texas Government Code requires OCA to obtain data on the rate at which state judges resign from office or do not seek re-election, as well as the reason for these actions. The valuable information you provide will be included in a report to the governor, lieutenant governor, and members of the legislature to assist them in ensuring that the compensation of state judges is adequate and appropriate.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Court: \_\_\_\_\_ Last Date of Service: \_\_\_\_\_

	A. Please indicate to what extent each of the following factors contributed to your decision to leave the Texas state judiciary. $\begin{bmatrix} x & y \\ y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ y \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{I}^{U} = \begin{bmatrix} y \\ z \\ z \\ z \end{bmatrix}_{$				Not At All
1	Salary				
2	Benefits				
3	Little or no career advancement opportunities				
4	Desire for self-employment				
5	Working conditions/environment (e.g., safety, work-related stress, and/or workload issues)				
6	Retirement				
7	Personal				
8	Other (please specify):				
9	Other (please specify):				

	B. Please indicate ( $$ ) what you plan to do after resigning or finishing out your term. <i>(Check only one.)</i>		
1	Obtain another position with higher salary and/or better benefits		
2	Obtain another position with comparable salary and/or benefits		
3	Become self-employed		
4	Run for another office		
5	Retire and not continue to work		
6	Retire but continue to work as a visiting judge		
7	Retire but continue to work in the private sector		
8	Retire but continue to work in state or local government		
9	Other (please specify):		

C. Please share with us any additional comments you may have regarding the topic in this survey.

## Please mail, fax, or email the completed survey to:

Mail:

Fax:

Office of Court Administration Attn: Angela Garcia P O Box 12066 Austin, TX 78711-2066 512-936-2423 Email: angela.garcia@txcourts.gov

For questions regarding this survey, please contact: Angela Garcia - (512) 936-1358